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Abstract: For many decades, economists have lamented the constraints on performing experiments in 
economics. However, with the birth of experimental economics this perception has changed. This field has 
developed considerably over the years. Now results from experiments are taken seriously. The experimental 
literature evolved in three directions: market experiments, game experiments and individual-decision making 
experiments. Over the years however, experimental methodology has been applied to more complex 
environments investigating macroeconomic issues and international economics. This paper provides a review 
of the experimental economics, its ingredients, its promises and skepticism. Further, we provide a review of 
the experiments that has been carried out in international economics.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Many economists have lamented the constraints on performing experiments in economics. For example, this 
is true of all editions of Paul Samuelson’s Principles of Economics. This continued after a while when William 
Nordhaus joined Samuelson as co-author. They wrote, “One possible way of figuring out economic laws…is by 
controlled experiments…Economists…cannot perform the controlled experiments of chemists and biologists 
because they cannot easily control other important factors. Like astronomers or meteorologists, they must be 
content largely to observe” (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985). Robinson (1979) expresses similar sentiments: 
“Economist cannot make use of controlled experiments to settle their differences”. However, these perceptions 
have changed over time. For example, Samuelson and Nordhaus (1988) in the next edition of their book 
changed their perceptions about experiments. They acknowledged the increasing use of experiments in 
economics (although they claimed that experiments in economics are more difficult that in other science). 
Samuelson and Nordhaus went further to say that there have been four techniques that have formed the 
approach by which economics science has progressed and experimentation is the latest one (the other three 
are observation, analysis and statistics). The change in view about experiments in Economics occurs in the 
mid 20th century after the development of microeconomics theories in the 1960s including game theory, 
industrial organization, search theory, voting theory and so on. These theories offer competing ways to 
understand microeconomic data, which in turn has helped the development of experimental economics. In its 
simplest form, laboratory experiments usually involve a group of subjects (typically university students), who 
play simple economic decision-making games and are paid based on the decisions they make.  
 
The game subjects play and the monetary rewards they can earn in the experiment are constructed in a 
manner that approximates the theoretical environment being studied so that the data can reflect on the 
validity of the theory. To date, primarily micro economists and game theorists to test individual or strategic 
behavior in various economic environments have used experimental methodology. In fact, the literature 
evolved in three directions: market experiments, game experiments and individual-decision making 
experiments. Over the years however, experimental methodology has been applied to more complex 
environments investigating macroeconomic issues and international trade. After 50 years and despite a lot of 
reluctance during its development, a growing numbers of economist have accepted experimental economics. 
Today, the prior belief that economics is not an experimental science is less and less widespread. The growing 
enthusiasm for laboratory experiments is characterized by an increase in experiments published in various 
mainstream economics journals, the introduction of the first academic journal relating to experimental 
economics called Experimental Economics in 1998 and recently a Nobel Price for one of its pioneers, Vernon 
Smith in 2002. This study provides the reader with an overview of what experiments in economics are about. 
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When it comes to empirical work in economics, we should note the deficiencies with field data. For example 
when it comes to international trade, a direct test of the law of comparative advantages is simple not possible 
because we rarely observed autarkic situation in the real world. Similarly, to test for theories on exchange 
rate, one need to unambiguously measure the price level of the economy and in the field data price indices 
may not be uniformly accurate measures of the short-term buying power of a good. The structure of the paper 
is as follows: section 2 provides a brief history of experimental economics, section 3 illustrates the 
ingredients of an experiment, section 4 provides the promises and skepticism about experimental economics, 
section 5 reviews the literature on experiments in international economics.   
 
A Brief History of Experimental Economics: Figure 1 adapted from Friedman and Cassar (2004) shows the 
evolution of experimental economics. Chamberlin (1948) presented the first market experiment to show that 
competitive equilibrium does not explain everything. Together with Plott, the first economics lab was created 
at Purdue University. This marked the beginning of experiments in economics. The 1952-RAND conference 
volume “The Design of Experiments in Decision Processes” in Santa Monica produced five papers, which involve 
game theory and individual decision choice tasks. Based on the success of the RAND conference, Selten 
commenced a long-term experimental program in oligopoly theory. At the same time, Siegel and Fouraker 
(1960) presented experiments in bargaining and group decision-making. These few developments 
summarise the emergence of experimental economics in the 1960s.  
 
Figure 1: Evolution of Experimental Economics (adapted from Friedman and Cassar (2004)) 
 
 
Weak institutions                                                                                 Strong Institutions  
 
                     Individual Choice             Bargaining             Games            Oligopoly                 Markets  
1900             Cognitive psychology  
                                     Social psychology  
 
1950                                                                                     RAND                                          Chamberlin  
                                                        Fouraker and Siegel     Princeton 
1960           Suppes and Atkinson                                                                                              Smith  
                                                                                                             Selten 
                   Luce                                                         Friedman and Hoggatt                Battalio and Kagel  







2000                                                  Still low-hanging fruit!          
 




The 1970s was characterized by a development of computerization in experiments and an increase in the 
number of economists conducting experiments. More laboratories were constructed for example at Caltech, 
Arizona and Indiana and so on. As shown in Figure 1, experiments were conducted on different issues ranging 
from individual choice to market experiments. The 1980s experienced the emergence of experiments to other 
applications such as asymmetric information, auctions, and financial markets and so on. The 1980s also saw 
the launch of the Economic Science Association (ESA) in 1986 with the aim of creating a platform for 
discussion and collaboration among experimentalists in Europe and US. In the 1990s, the first issue of the 
journal on experimental economics, Experimental Economics, was launched which consolidate the emergence 
of experimental economics. In 1997, the Economic Science Association became fully international with 
subsequent annual meetings alternating between Europe and North America. What about 2000s? In many 
other fields of economics, it is hard for researchers to find a research topic, which has not been touched on. 
Even if he is able to do so easily, it will take him years to produce meaningful research. Experimental 
economics, on the other hand is still to be explored. Friedman and Cassar (2004) argue that there is still low-
hanging fruit to attract young researchers. The fruit, which I want to pick, is experiments in international 
trade. In 2002, the founding president of ESA, Vernon Smith won the Nobel Price in Economics for his 
pioneering work in experimental economics. He shared the price with Danny Kahneman, a psychologist who 
has done important experimental research on decision theory.                             
 
Ingredients of an Experiment: According to Wilde (1980), the basic idea of a laboratory experiment is to 
create a small-scale microeconomic environment in the laboratory where adequate control can be maintained 
and accurate measurement of relevant behavior guaranteed. Smith (1982, 1989) who argued that a 
laboratory experiment could be thought as investigating the behavior of a microeconomic system picked up 
the idea of Wilde. According to Smith, a laboratory experiment consists of two components: environment and 
institutions The environment consists of a list of agents participating in the experiments {1,…N), each agent 
has preferences (ui for agent i ), their initial endowments (Wi), the number of commodities in the economy 
{1,…K} and the production technology (Ti ).Thus, agent i is defined by a triplet of characteristics Ei = (Ui, Ti, Wi) 
defined in the K-dimensional commodity space. A microeconomic environment is then defined by the 
collection E = (E1, EN) of these characteristics. The institution defines the language of communications in the 
economy, the rules that govern the exchange of information and the rules under which messages become 
binding contract. The language of communication is defined by M = {Mi…MN} consisting of message element m 
= (mi…mN) where Mi is the set of messages that can be sent by agent i (i =1). An institution also states a set of 
allocation rules h = (hi(m), …hN(m)) and a set of cost imputation rules c = (ci(m), …cN(m)) where hi(m) is the 
commodity allocation to agents i and ci(m) is the payment made by i, each a function of the messages sent to 
all agents. Finally, the institution defines a set of adjustment process rules, common to all agents, g (to, t, T) 
consisting of a starting rule g (to…), a transition rule g (..., t...) and a closing rule g (…T). Each agent’s property 
rights in communication is then defined by the collection Ii = (Mi, hi (m), ci(m), g (to, t, T)). A microeconomic 
institution is described by the collection of these individual property right characteristics I = (Ii…IN). 
 
A microeconomic system is then described as an association of an environment and an institution, S = (E, I). 
This system is activated by the behavioral choices of agents in the set M. Smith (1982) showed that in a static 
description of an economy, agents’ behavior could be defined as a function mi =i (Ei/I) carrying the 
characteristics Ei of agent i into a message mi, conditional upon the property right specifications of the 
operant institutions I. If Ei includes all the exchange relevant agent features, then  =i for all i. Given the 
message sending behavior of each agent,  (E/I), the institution determines the outcome hi(m)= hi( (Ei/I), … 
(EN/I)) and ci(m)= ci( (Ei/I), … (EN/I)). With this framework, it is possible to understand the roles of theory 
and experiment and their relationship, in a progressive research program. However note that not all elements 
of the microeconomic system are observed, for example, preferences are not observed but induced (Cobb- 
Douglas, CES or additively separable). The choice of institutions depends on the aim of the experiment and 
one of the research areas which have been explored over years tried to answer this question: Which trading 
institution yield the most nearly Pareto optimal outcome? Thus, the purpose of a laboratory experiment then 
can be thought of revealing the systematic relationship between the environment, the institutions and the 
resulting behavior. With control in place, the experimental data obtained from this interaction can be 
interpreted more easily than field data. If outcome X (say, competitive equilibrium) is always associated with 
Y (double auction), then we can conclude that Y causes X (unless there are other common factors in the lab 
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too). This causal relationship can is hard to find in field data. Given an absence of control an observed 
correlation between X and Y may be due to Y indirectly causing Y, or may be due to some unobserved variable 
causing both X and Y. Thus, field data gives a composite test of the environment and institutions. 
 
2. Promises and Skeptisms 
 
One of the arguments against laboratory experiment in economics is concerned with the control of factors 
(considered one of the advantages of experiments). Skeptics argued that control disregard reality and this 
lack of reality strips experimental work of its relevance. Accordingly, experimental results can be viewed as 
spurious. Most enthusiasts in laboratory experiments recognize this and have written much about it. These 
work include Smith (1976, 1982), Wilde (1980), Plott (1991b) and Starmer (1999). Smith and Wilde have 
argued that under certain precepts or assumptions, laboratory micro economies can be regarded as real 
economies systems; their behavior can be thought as real economic behavior and can be used to test theories. 
Although these precepts are not self-evident truths or sufficient conditions for a valid experiment, if these 
precepts hold it follows that the environment has desirable characteristics. These are: 
 
 Nonsatiation. Subjects must prefer more reward medium to less, and not become satiated. 
 Saliency. The rewards received by the subjects depend on her actions as defined by the institutional 
settings that she understands. Saliency requires that rewards earned by subjects be tied to their 
decisions.    
 
These two precepts are related to the reward structure of an experiment. However, there is a need to control 
for motivational factors. Wilde (1980) identified two problems that can arise although no satiation and 
saliency are satisfied. First, subjects may place subjective valuations on their participation over and above the 
payoff they received. Second, subjects may also place subjective valuations on the rewards earned by other 
participants. To alleviate, two more precepts are introduced. 
 
 Dominance. Changes in subjects’ utility from the experiment come predominantly from the reward 
medium and other influences are negligible.  
 Privacy. Subjects are informed only on her own payoffs. 
 
Both Wilde and Smith argued that if these precepts are satisfied then the laboratory experiment could be 
considered as a small microeconomic environment where real people make real decisions. Although 
laboratory experimentation can be considered as real, one may question its validity. Validity is a crucial issue 
of all data sources. Laboratory data pose two types of validity questions. First, internal validity: Do the data 
bridge the gap between models and experiments? Second, external validity: Can the inferences obtained help 
to understand and predict the behavior of the real world? An understanding of the role of experiments in 
relation to both theory and experiments is required before further discussion about internal and external. 
From a formal point of view, a theory consists of a set of assumptions and definitions, together with the 
conclusion that logically follows from them. Skeptics may argue that laboratory experimentation is 
unnecessary because a theory is correct, as it is internally consistent. However, more is required from a 
theory than there are no errors in the underlying mathematics. In this sense, internal consistency is just a first 
step.  
 
The assumptions of economics theories can be divided into two: behavioral and structural. In game-theoretic 
terms, structural assumptions determine the extensive form, and the behavioral assumptions pertain to the 
equilibrium concept. Experimentalists are not usually interested in inducing or imposing restrictions on key 
behavioral assumptions, for example, a belief that one’s purchases have no effect on market price. However, 
by controlling agent’s information and incentives, the laboratory environment can reflect quite closely the 
structural assumptions of a specific theory. This allows the experimentalist to evaluate the behavioral 
assumptions of a theory. Further, laboratory experimentation can be used to check the sensitivity of 
unrealistic structural assumptions. The task of establishing internal validity of an experimental result 
depends a lot on context-specific knowledge and techniques. Certainly there are no reasons for a laboratory 
experiment to model all the assumptions of a specific theory. One potential flaw of this process is that if all the 
assumptions are satisfied, given laboratory modeling is often assisted or even inspired by mathematics, then 
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there is a greater chance that the theory will survive the laboratory research. An additional flaw as pointed 
out by Plott (1991b) is that satisfying all the assumptions of a theory is practically impossible as assumptions 
in economies theories are rarely stated in operational terms and the theories are so unclear. Smith argues 
that experimentalist is interested in staging theory, which can be done in natural world as well as in simple 
situations. By staging theories in a simple laboratory environment, it permits the experimenter to have a 
better control over variables. So the experiment should be at least “as rich as the theories they test” (Smith, 
1980). Smith (1982) wrote that if the variables are not parameters of the theory, then the criticism of 
“unrealism” applies equally to the theory and the experiment. 
 
There are many opinions about the applicability of experimental methodology to real world phenomena and 
policy decisions. According to Nelson (1998) and Loewenstein (1999), experimentalists are often accused of 
producing results that are not transferable outside the economics laboratory: the problem of external validity 
or parallelism. According to Guala (2003), external validity is the most important methodological problem of 
experimental economics as well as the least discussed despite the fact that criticised against experimental 
economics stems precisely from the suspicion that their results cannot be ‘exported’ outside the laboratory. 
Smith (1982) proposed a precept that can be viewed as a sufficient condition for the transferability of 
experimental results to the real world, which he named parallelism: “Proposition about the behavior of 
individuals and performances of institutions that have been tested in laboratory microeconomics apply also to 
non laboratory microeconomics where similar ceteris paribus conditions hold”. According to parallelism, it 
should be alleged that experimental results carry over to the world outside the laboratory. Smith considers 
that his proposition is equivalent to that quotation of Shapley (1964): “As far as we can tell, the same physical 
law prevails everywhere”. However, the advantage of control over the environment and the institution allows 
the experimentalist to modify the experiment to resemble the real world in many relevant aspects as 
possible.  
 
Plott (1982) dealt with the general concerns of external validity by arguing that while laboratory processes 
are simple in comparison to naturally occurring processes, they are real processes in the sense that real 
people participate for real and follow real rules to make substantial profits. Further, he argued that the 
simplicity and the small-scale of laboratory environment relative to field environments are merits. General 
theories, by definition, apply to all special cases. Thus, general theories and models should be expected to 
work in the special case of laboratory market. If models are not to capture what is observed in this special 
case, they can be modified or rejected in the light of experience. This establishes the relevance of 
experimental methods. Using different examples, Plott (1987) identified five dimensions or forms of 
parallelism between policy problems and laboratory experiments. These are (1) ex-post evaluation of a 
decision (2) demonstration of theory (3) shifts in the burden of proof (4) direct extrapolation and (5) design 
of new types of organization. He concluded that: Experimentation is a source of experience similar to the 
experience one acquires as one practices the piano before a concert of that a team acquires as it practices before 
a game. The connections between such experiences and final performance can have many dimensions. The kinds 
of useful practice undertaken in preparation for a football game can range from ballet to scrimmage. The 
scrimmage itself can involve plays that the coach thinks the opponent will use as well as plays that the coach is 
sure will not be used but are educational. Similarly, experiments that provide the best insights about the nature 
of upcoming options might include faithful reproductions of the anticipated situation, but there is no reasons to 
believe that good experiments take that form In fact, there is no priori reason to believe that faithful 
reproductions would be any use at all.  
 
Marc (2004) branded the Plott-Smith the empirical realism point of view. This standard justification of 
experimental economics sees theories as universal and so assumes implicitly that the laboratory- even with 
the absence of realism- must be a place where it is possible to test them. Surely, the evaluation process of 
laboratory experimentation should ideally begin not in the domain of the complex natural world, where 
numerous disconcerting events may impinge on variables of interest, but strictly on the domain of the theory. 
This localist realist approach of Cartwright (1983, 1989 and 1999) sees theories valid in its domain of 
application. Therefore, if the pertinent features of the theory’s domain can be introduced in the laboratory 
settings then this give an important role of experiments in economics without considerations of external 
validity. Replication is another advantage that makes laboratory experimentation interesting. Replication 
includes three components: observation, interpretation and conclusion that must be satisfied one after the 
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other. Certainly, those economists who rely on field data will observe the same thing since they use the same 
data. One can say that he has replicated an experiment if he fails to reject the hypothesis that the 
experimental data come from the same population as the replicated experiment. This implies that the 
experimenter, his/her subjects and/or the procedures are not important treatment variables. The 
interpretation of observation requires theory or at least empirical interpretation of the theory in the context 
that generated the data. Either empirical interpretation of theory is important because the theory is not 
developed directly in terms of what is observed or the data are not collected for theory testing. Consequently, 
failure to replicate may be because there are differences in interpretation, which in turn result in different 
meaning being ascribed to the theory. The conclusion reached in two different research studies may be 
different even though the data and interpretation are the same. In economics, this is most often due to 
different model specifications. This problem is inherent in non-experimental methodologies, in which, at best 
one can usually estimate only the parameter of a prescribed model and cannot credibly test one model 
against another.  
 
Starmer (1999) discussed two points that have put forward by sceptics about using human subjects in 
laboratory experimentation. The first results from the fact that human subjects are self-conscious behaving 
agents. Thus, behavior of human subjects is more variable than that of physical objects and may be sensitive 
to situation they faced; hence, the behavior observed in the laboratory may different from that in a natural 
setting. Starmer argued that such observations are weak as even sceptics about laboratory experimentation 
agreed that one purpose of building economic theories is to predict the actual behavior of economic agents. A 
skeptic might agree that human subjects’ behavior appears to be sensitive to various features of the 
experimental design, but might interpret this as a sign that the results are largely the artifact of the 
environment in which they were produced. Thus, human behavior may be vulnerable to all kinds of biases 
from extraneous sources and from the way the experiment is set up and the way the decision problems are 
framed. As pointed out by Starmer, these observations do not undermine the use of laboratory 
experimentation rather it has implications for the appropriate design of experiments. He argued that subjects’ 
pools could be divided into two groups: a control group and an experimental group. 
  
To contribute to this discussion, we can say that these doubts can result in advantages of laboratory 
experimentation. In the laboratory, we can observe how human agents are able to operate under specific 
conditions. Economic theories rarely answer questions of how human agents process information, how they 
choose strategies, how they learn and observe and how they adapt to changing situations. Surely, answers to 
these questions are important to many core areas of economics (for example, monetary theory, industrial 
organization, international trade etc.). Through direct observation of human behavior, derived in well-defined 
economic environment, experimentalists seek to evaluate the capacity of competing theories to organize that 
data, and they provide data that can lead to the discovery of new phenomena. Moreover, unlike field 
observation, laboratory work usually allows the demonstration that the phenomenon in question is real and 
is robust to background factors.    
 
3. Experiments in International Economics 
 
When it comes to international trade, a direct test of the law of comparative advantages is not possible 
because autarky is never observed in the real world. To test for theories on exchange rate, one need to 
unambiguously measure the price level of the economy and in the field data price indices may not be 
uniformly accurate measures of the short-term buying power of a good. The experimentalist supplies 
consistent inflation data that have a known generating process. An international trade experiment involves 
many markets operating at the same time; it also involves production and consumption. Thus, it is more 
complex than individual- decision based experiment. However, there has been a development of well-defined 
institutions that can sustain more complex environments in the laboratory (for example MUDA). In addition, 
if the experiment is complex, pilot experiments can be run. In a pilot, volunteers work through the 
experiment in a dry run setting and provide feedback regarding the clarity of the instructions, the logic of the 
procedures and so forth. Arifovic (1996) analysed the behaviour of exchange rates in a laboratory setting and 
as a genetic algorithm. She used a fundamentally non-stationary environment since the subjects did not know 
when the experiment ends. However, her model states that the stationary nominal and real exchange rate is 
indeterminate. The subjects were trading one homogeneous good for two different currencies. The results of 
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the experiments showed continuing fluctuations of the exchange rate. At the heart of the model is the 
overlapping generation’s framework that the author implemented. Subjects were assumed young in time t 
and old in time t+1. They were reborn such that they are young in odd numbered periods and old in even 
numbered periods.  
 
In the Noussair, Plott and Reizman (1997) experiment, subjects are classified as either producers or 
consumers. There are six agents in each country: country A and country B with equal number of producers 
and consumers. There were two goods markets; X, Y, and one foreign exchange market (that of country A 
inside country B). Thus residents of country A wanting to buy goods from country B has to go to Country B 
and sell some currency in which he is endowed against currency B. Thus, suppliers in country A could not 
earn foreign currencies; they could only sell goods against their local currency. The functioning of the goods 
markets in these experiments were problematic as imports were allowed but exports were not (no agent 
could transform inventories held at home to the inventory of the same commodity held in the foreign 
country). These frictions created adverse conditions in the goods markets as pointed out by the author. The 
author did not found the presence of purchasing power parity although the predicted value for the exchange 
rate was accurate. Since the law of one price was violated in the market with the greatest friction, a simple 
notion of purchasing power parity was generally rejected. Furthermore, the predictions of the competitive 
model in an economy with two locations did not hold uniformly. Fisher and Kelly (2000) analysed 
experimental markets where subjects buy and sell two assets. They designed experiments where the market 
was not stationary. Compared to the other works, they add one basic element in their design: simultaneous 
trading in the two assets. This was added to capture the possibility of cross-asset arbitrage, which is present 
in foreign exchange markets. In fact, one of the main conclusions of this study is that subjects get the cross 
exchange rate right (the exchange rate was well behaved). The results however showed that there is 
overwhelming evidence of the existence of bubbles in each individual asset. Because the bubbles in the two 
asset markets were almost perfectly correlated, simple aspects of exchange rate theory did well enough even 
in that non-stationary setting. Fisher and Kelly also observed the existence of an exchange rate risk premium.  
 
Noussair et al (1997) can consider the paper by Fisher (2001) as an improvement of the earlier paper partly 
because the goods markets are very simple. Good x are available in elastic supply at constant x-currency price 
in every period and good y are available in elastic supply at a y-currency price that is announced at the 
beginning of each period. In essence, the experimenter creates the supply side of the goods markets.  The 
foreign market is also more transparent. Every subject is endowed with a supply of x-currency, more than 
sufficient for the liquidity needs of the entire session. However, in each round, there is a fixed supply of y-
currency sold in a call market. Thus, the experimenter creates the supply side of the foreign exchange market. 
Subjects were allowed to buy as much of the x-good as they wanted at a fixed price. Similarly, they were 
allowed to buy as much of the y-good as they want. The only limit on their purchases of the y-good had to do 
with how much foreign exchange they had managed to purchase. The main conclusion of the paper is strong 
evidence of the relative version of purchasing power parity. Three other results were reported: purchasing 
power parity holds in absolute terms, strong support were found for covered interest parity and uncovered 
interest parity holds in these experiments. One can argue that these results may be dependent on the 
introduction of the call market where there is a fixed supply of foreign exchange. Modelling the foreign 
exchange market in this way enables only one market-clearing mechanism.   
 
Noussair et al (1995) tried to answer questions related to the law of comparative advantage, factor price 
equalisation, terms of trade, efficiency in production and exchange as guided by multiple and interacting 
markets and the effects of tariffs on international transactions. Experiments comprise either eight or sixteen 
subjects. Two environments were invoked: the Ricardian model of international trade motivated 
Environment 1 and Environment 2 was very near to the Hecskcher-Ohlin model. Two models were identified 
that were supposed to provide intuition needed for help with the interpretation of market data. Those were 
the competitive model and the autarkic model. Among the main results of this study, we have the following: 
rejection of both the competitive model and the autarkic model as a representation of the market data, the 
presence of the law of comparative advantage, the convergence of production and consumption to the 
competitive model predictions, the presence of the factor price equalisation theorem and last but not the least 




Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, exchange rates 
tended to fluctuate widely. A large theoretical literature exists illustrating the impact of exchange rate 
movements on the firm’s export and import decisions. The basic assumptions underlying these models are 
that a firm must incur an entry cost to enter export markets and that this entry cost is sunk. In a simple world 
in which exchange rate changes are perceived to be permanent (and future exchange rate uncertainty zero), 
the firm will enter the export market when the expected gross profits from participating in that market are 
greater than the sunk cost entry. The firm however will not exit the market until the exchange rate reaches 
the point where the expected gross profits from remaining in the market are negative. This implies that 
temporary exchange rate misalignments have a persistent effect on trade, trade hysteresis. Ansic and Pugh 
(1999) provide an experimental investigation of trade hysteresis taking the model as representative of the 
literature on trade hysteresis. 
 
Ansic and Pugh (1999) test the corresponding hypothesis that firms trading policy is unresponsive to 
exchange movements over a wide range of values and that this band is positively related to the magnitude of 
both concrete sunk costs and exchange rate variability. The experiment consisted of 100 students trading on 
a computerized market. There were 5 trading sessions each lasting 8 minutes. The exchange rates according 
to which subjects entered or exited the market were actually daily US dollar: ECU rates from Jan 7th 1980 to 
Jan 15th 1993. At the start of the experiment, subjects were informed of the cost of entering the market. They 
found that sunk costs are an important determinant of trade activity. When international trade is guided by 
exchange rate uncertainty and sunk cost, sunk cost of entry predisposes firms to wait and see. The 
experimental evidence of Ansic and Pugh (1999) showed that sunk costs are an important determinant of 
trade hysteresis when exchange rate variability is present. However, the experimental analysis does not show 
a positive relation between the degree of exchange rate variability and trade hysteresis. Engelman and 
Normann (2003) analysed the model of strategic trade policy proposed by Brander and Spencer (1985). They 
created a Cournot duopoly framework, matching the requirements of the Brander and Spencer (1985) theory. 
There are two countries consisting of a firm and a government. The firms export a homogenous good to a 
third country. Governments simultaneously decide whether to subsidize their firm. After the decisions of the 
governments are known, the firms play a Cournot duopoly game. The main question in this experiment is 
whether governments actually subsidize their firms. In the first stage, Government decides on the level of 
subsidy s, which can be either 0 or 12 (equilibrium rate) with the aim to maximize welfare. In the second 
stage, firms choose their level of production based on the choice of s by the government. They found that the 
data are not consistent with the predictions of the Brander and Spencer (1985) strategic trade policy model. 
Government tended to subsidies in too few cases (roughly 50% of the cases) to give conclusive evidence in 
favor of the theory. In addition, there were no indications of a learning trend towards the equilibrium. As 
more periods of the games are played, the number of subsidy decisions decreases, again suggesting a 
departure from the predictions. On the other hand, industry output tended to match the predictions. 
 
Noussair et al (2003) created a large experimental environment to represent 3 countries trading in a 
perfectly competitive world, which they argued is the most complex to date to study market calibration. They 
were interested firstly, in whether equilibration is observed and secondly in whether there any other 
principles that emerge to govern system behaviour.   The complexity introduced in the laboratory took the 
form of the number of goods (3 outputs: x, y and z and 2 inputs k and l), and to introduction of a separate 
currency for each country, the nature of economic activities and their interdependence. The laboratory 
economy is international in its economic “structure”. The economy consists of 3 types of agents: suppliers who 
were given endowments of l and k, which they can supply, to the input markets; producers who were 
endowed with production capability and could produce one of the three outputs using the inputs; consumers 
who could purchase x, y and z from producers.  Producers could sell x, y and z in any country whereas inputs 
were immobile. Each country had its own currency A, B and C that have their own market. Only domestic 
currency had value to agents. Thus, foreign currencies were only useful when importations of goods are 
conducted.  In addition to interaction in the local country, international transactions were guided by a cash-in 
hand constraint, i.e. before agents can purchase goods internationally they need to buy currency of the 
particular country.    
 
To maximise gains from trade, the following pattern of activity must occur. Suppliers sell input l and k to 
producers in their own country. The latter use l and k to produce x, y and z which are sold to consumers 
83 
 
irrespective of their location. To buy a good from a foreign producer, consumers need to buy the currency of 
the country from which he wishes to import. Each country has 7 markets in operation. Noussair et al (2003) 
found that even in this complex environment, the equilibration1 hypothesis holds. Other interesting property 
of the experimental data reveals (1) the existence of a home bias property- the level of imports and 
production of export goods are lower than the predictions of the competitive model (2) the existence of 
growing GDP across time (period) (3) the gravity model property- GDP growth causes an increase in 
international trade (4) Purchasing Power Parity convergence.    
  
Noussair et al (2007) created a large experimental environment to represent 3 countries trading in a 
perfectly competitive world, which they argued is the most complex to date to study market calibration. They 
were interested firstly, in whether equilibration is observed and secondly whether there are other principles 
that emerge to govern system behaviour. The complexity introduced in the laboratory took the following 
form:   number of goods, currency for each country and nature of economic activities. The laboratory 
economy is international in its economic “structure”. The economy consists of 3 types of agents: suppliers who 
were given endowments of l and k, which they can supply, to the input markets; producers who were 
endowed with production capability and could produce one of the three outputs using the inputs; consumers 
who could purchase x, y and z from producers.  Producers could sell x, y and z in any country whereas inputs 
were immobile. Each country had its own currency A, B and C that have their own market. Only domestic 
currency had value to agents. Thus, foreign currencies are only useful when importations of goods are 
conducted.  In addition to interaction in the local country, international transactions were guided by a cash-in 
hand constraint, i.e. before agents can purchase goods internationally they need to buy currency of the 
particular country. Noussair et al (2007) found that even in this complex environment, the equilibration2 
hypothesis holds. Other interesting property of the experimental data reveals (1) the existence of a home bias 
property- the level of imports and production of export goods are lower than the predictions of the 
competitive model (2) the existence of growing GDP across time (period) (3) the gravity model property- GDP 
growth causes an increase in international trade (4) Purchasing Power Parity convergence.    
 
Noussair and Powell (2008) constructed experimental markets to observe behaviour of assets markets that 
experience a peak or trough in fundamentals. They focused on how well the market tracks the fundamental 
value, how well it reflects trends in the fundamentals and how well it reveals the timing of a change in trend. 
They also consider how these measures of pricing accuracy evolve as traders gain more experience through 
repetition of markets. The results are not obvious a priori in light of the string tendency of experimental asset 
markets to generate bubbles and crashes when traders are  experienced, a result that nonetheless has only 
been established for assets with fundamental values that are monotonically decreasing of constant over time. 
Jones (1961) argued that in a 3 countries and 3 goods model and assuming that each country is assigned to 
produce one good, then for the law of comparative advantage the optimal assignment in the 3 x 3 case must 
be such that            
 













           
 
Literally, this implies that the product of labor requirements in the efficient assignment of goods to countries 
must be less than the corresponding product in all possible assignments that allocate the same number of 
countries to each commodity as does the efficient assignment. Nowbutsing (2011) created an experimental 
environment, which mimic the 3 x 3 Ricardian Model. There are three goods X, Y ad Z and one factor of 
production labor, L, which is mobile across sectors in a particular country but immobile across countries. 
Subjects were divided into two types of agents namely consumers and producers. There was equal number of 
agents in all countries. Consumers own factors of production and have induced preferences over the three 
consumption goods. The utility function were additively and separable over the three goods. Producers have 
initial endowments of input, and earn profits buying L and selling X, Y and Z. Countries differ in their 
                                                 
1
 Both stabilisation and convergence were present. 
2
 Both stabilisation and convergence were present. 
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production function such that one country was characterized as ‘extreme’ comparative advantage and the 
other two as ‘intermediate’ comparative advantage.  
 
The market system works as follows: consumers sell their endowment of L to producers of their own, and 
then buy production goods from any of the three countries. Consumers get utility from consumption and any 
profit made by price speculation. Producers buy L in their own country and produce X, Y and Z for consumers 
in any country, getting utility from profits attained in the production and market activity. Therefore, the 
experiment includes nine markets that are organized according to a double auction. Nowbutsing (2011) 
found that the pattern of trade and output predicted by the theoretical model is observed in the extreme 
comparative advantage country; however, this is not the case for the two intermediate comparative 
advantage countries. Thus, the author concluded that the patterns of trade and output as predicted by the law 
of comparative advantage are not observed evolving within the experimental setting. Nowbutsing (2011b) 
explore the 3 x 3 Ricardian model in two scenarios multiple imports tariffs and customs union. The 
experimental environment was distorted version of the environment reported in Nowbutsing (2011a). The 
first environment consisted of multiple import tariffs and the second environment allowed the creation 
between two countries namely one ‘extreme’ comparative advantage country and one ‘intermediate’ 
comparative advantage country. The equilibrium   was fully characterised under both environment. Starting 
from a tariff-distorted situation, it is found that when a customs union is formed there is an increase in trade 
flows among members; a rise in individual consumption of some goods; a clear term of trade effect and the 
existence of trade diversion. The experimental results support the simulation findings of Venables (2003), 
who showed that countries, which have extreme comparative advantage in a customs union, would be 
generally more vulnerable to trade diversion.      
 
Binmore and Shaked have conducted many experiments over the years and they have contributed 
analytically to the advancement of experimental economics. However, in a recent article, they set a sceptical 
point about the use of experiments: ‘Should we follow those experiments economists who seek recognition of 
their subject as a science by adopting the scientific standards that operate in neighbouring discipline like biology 
or psychology? Or should we….[treat] experimental results  as just one more rhetorical tool to be quoted when 
convenient in seeking to convert others whatever your own point of view may be? More specifically, they 
question the claim that experiments make about human behaviour when these conclusion are extrapolated 
from slender data. Eckel and Gintis (2010) provides several examples where experimental economics has not 
been faulty in this respect namely self and other regarding behaviour, application of several theoretical model 
to best suit the experimental data, modelling other regarding preferences, neoclassical economics and other 
regarding behaviour, the rationality of backward induction and inequality aversion.   
 
4. Conclusion  
 
Over the last 50 years, experiments have helped experimentalist to cultivate the ability to exploit the control 
permitted by the laboratory to evaluate economic theory. Field research rarely allows such control. However, 
we should note that experimental research does not undermine the importance of field research. Theories 
and models in the field make many judgments about assumptions, parameters and behavioral principles. By 
using experiments, however, experimentalists provide data that can be used to assess these judgments. I have 
tried to introduce the ingredients of an experiment as well as its promises and problems. The value 
experiments add to economics, much the same as to the natural sciences, comes down to one word: control. In 
experiments, rules of interaction, the flow of information and the reward system can all be controlled in ways 
that are rarely possible in the field. External validity is the ground on which experiments are criticized the 
most. Good experiments usually involve simplification. Simplification is an important means for obtaining the 
control that permits us to see causes and consequences. However, at the same time, this simplification means 
that most laboratory phenomenon are somewhat removed from the field phenomenon that we ultimately 
wish to understand. We nevertheless have good reasons to believe that insights and lessons learned in the lab 
will extend to the field: The subjects of economic experiments are actual people responding to real monetary 
incentives. With the increase use of computerization, it is possible to simulate even quite sophisticated 




Experimental economists employ a variety of strategies to challenge the robustness of their results. Perhaps 
the simplest is to stress test the aspects of the experiment that differ from the field. Are you suspicious that 
the students you have in your experiments differ from managers? Use managers (Cooper et al, 1999). 
Alternatively, certain aspects of the field environment are absent; systematically add them (a method known 
as parallelism (Grether et al, 1981). You can also gain confidence by checking whether the patterns found in 
the experiment agree with known facts in the field (Bolton et al, 1998). Finally, one can move the experiment 
out of the lab and into the field as Lucking-Rieley (1999) did in his Internet auction experiments. The scope of 
experiments is not limited to only academics, it has been also used by businesses, and for example, now there 
are economics laboratories at IBM’s T.J Watson Research Center and at Hewlett-Packard Laboratories. 
Attaining internal validity or external validity surely depends on the purpose of the experiment. If our 
purpose is to speak to theorist, we need not bother about the problem of external validity.  
 
In my opinion, there is a case for expanding the application of experiments to more complex environment 
such as international trade. I am surprised that even some experimentalists were pessimistic about the 
expansion of the application of laboratory experimentation. For example, Davis and Holt (1993) concluded 
that there are issues about parameters and preferences that do not permit us to address issues such as 
Ricardian Equivalence. However, a piece of work addresses Ricardian Equivalence in the laboratory- Cadsby 
and Frank (1991). One may also argue that trade experiments are not interesting as the environment are 
more complex. For example, there are many countries in the real world but it is not essential for subjects in 
an experiment to know what the aim of the experiment is. Empirical studies on trade theory tend to focus 
more in explaining real world phenomena. In this sense, it can be said that those studies move toward 
external validity. However, the experimental approach has several advantages compared to field data analysis 
of trade theories when it comes to testing the predictions of trade theories. In the laboratory, we can design 
markets according to the assertions of theory. By doing so, we can provide conditions suited to making the 
theory work well. A second advantage concerns interpretation of the data. In field markets, there are often 
market dynamics or other external factors that influence market outcomes and which sometimes make 
interpretation of the data difficult. In the laboratory, there are no such uncontrolled changes of the market 
determinants. As the cost and demand structure of the market are given by design, the data can 
unambiguously be interpreted with respect to the underlying theoretical model. Experiments in international 
trade can be categorised under the umbrella of market experiments. In addition, the development of new 
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